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Can Intergovernmental Organizations be Peacebuilders in Intra-state 
War? 
This article examines the sources of authority of intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) conducting peacebuilding independently of peace operations. Expanding 
Inis Claude’s notion of the two identities of the UN, the article suggests re-
imagining the state/non-state divide in international organization by 
distinguishing between governmental and non-governmental sources of authority, 
rather than between different types of organizations. Similar to international non-
governmental organizations, IGOs depend on moral and expert credibility as non-
state sources of authority in peacebuilding. This reliance and the in-built pro-
government bias curtail their ability to engage in transformative peacebuilding, 
rendering it likely that IGO interventions contribute to maintaining existing 
power imbalances. 
Keywords: intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental 
organizations, peacebuilding, legitimacy, authority, First and Second United 
Nations 
Introduction 
Defying traditional research paradigms in IR theory, intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) are increasingly recognized as ‘self-directed’ (Oestreich 2012), ‘semi-
independent’ (Cronin 2002, 55), or, at times ‘corporate’ actors (Claude 1996: 291) with 
steadily expanding mandates in global politics (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; 
Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2004; Peters et al. 2009; Weiss, 
Carayannis, and Jolly 2009). Their actor-like qualities notwithstanding, the involvement 
of IGOs in the resolution of intra-state wars poses a number of challenges, particularly 
if these organizations conduct operational peacebuilding activities such as disarmament, 
reconstruction, dialogue, or institution-building projects, to name but a few, within the 
domestic affairs of states.  
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In line with the other contributions to this special section, I define peacebuilding 
as a multilateral endeavour that is jointly conducted by the United Nations and its 
bodies, bilateral development agencies, international organizations, and NGOs to help 
states and societies emerging from internal violent conflict transit to a more stable, or 
‘self-sustaining’, peace after the conclusion of a peace agreement. According to 2010 
UN Peacebuilding Support Office guidance, peacebuilding “is neither a purely political, 
security nor developmental process, but one that must bring together security, political, 
economic, social and human rights elements in a coherent and integrated way” 
(UNPBSO 2010, 1).1 As such, peacebuilding spans the entire spectrum of 
reconstruction and development, state building, and peacemaking efforts, including 
justice, mediation, and reconciliation, “undertaken on the far side of conflict” (UN 
2000, 13). While originally conceived of as providers of ‘technical’ reconstruction and 
development assistance (UNSC 1993), IGOs like the UN Development Programme, 
UNESCO, or the World Bank have steadily expanded their peacebuilding portfolios to 
include local reconciliation (UNDP 2008; 2011), political dialogue processes, or the 
prevention of violent extremism (UNDP 2016; UNESCO 2015). 
A considerable share of international post-war peacebuilding efforts is 
conducted outside the scope of UN-mandated peace(-keeping) operations. What this 
means is that a host of international governmental and non-governmental organizations 
such as the international financial institutions, specialized agencies of the UN system 
and of regional organizations, development and humanitarian INGOs and bilateral 
assistance agencies operate in post-war countries not on the basis of a resolution and 
mandate issued by the UN Security Council, but based on the invitation by and an 
agreement with host state governments.  
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In contrast to peacebuilding programmes conducted within the framework of a 
peace(-keeping) operation or international transitory administration mandated by the 
UN Security Council, this little defined ‘grey area’2 of peacebuilding work therefore 
immediately depends on the consent and cooperation of target state governments and is 
rarely fully coordinated. This dependency implies that IGOs can only be effective 
peacebuilders if one of two conditions is met: either, IGOs can draw on the political 
(and at times, persuasive or coercive) clout of a peace operation or of their member 
states (Gippert 2017), or they succeed in gaining the consent and constructive 
cooperation of the target state government as gatekeeper to any kind of involvement of 
international agents in their domestic affairs.  
These stipulations might appear fairly obvious, and they mirror the conundrums 
of conducting military peacekeeping under conditions of uncertain consent or co-
operation in intra-state settings. However, while the latter have extensively been 
analysed (Bellamy and Williams 2010; Sloan 2011; Tsagourias 2007; White 2015), the 
degree to which civilian peace support activities are hampered by parallel dynamics and 
the implications of IGO dependence on target state governments for conducting 
peacebuilding without Security Council backing have rarely been systematically 
assessed (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Lake 2016). 
The present article fills this gap by developing a conceptual framework for 
systematically assessing the scope of action of IGOs operating in this grey area of post-
war peace support. It re-examines Claude’s (1996) seminal distinction between the 
‘First’ and ‘Second’ United Nations and related conceptualizations of the so-called 
‘Third UN’ (Weiss, Carayannis and Jolly 2009; Kittikhoun and Weiss 2012) to explore 
the relationship between state based and non-state based sources of legitimacy and 
authority that IGOs within and outside the UN system can bring to bear on non-military 
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peace support. In particular, the article develops further Claude’s insights on the link 
between different dimensions of the UN system and their specific resources for 
fostering international peace and security to the wider field of non-military peace 
support to assess the sources and resources of legitimacy and authority that IGOs 
employ to conduct peacebuilding programmes within the domestic space of sovereign 
states. 
In seeking to conceptualize the grey area of non-coercive intergovernmental 
peace support, the article sets out two related arguments. Firstly, while IGOs such as the 
United Nations Development Programme, the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) – and evidently the Bretton Woods institutions – possess 
more financial and political leverage vis-à-vis target state governments compared to 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), their room for manoeuvre in 
contested settings is in fact curtailed by the very same limitations as those faced by most 
INGOs (Vedder 2007). By having to eschew any semblance of political partisanship or 
interference, the scope of action of IGOs vis-à-vis host state governments is in 
important respects more akin to that of large INGOs than to those of the political organs 
of the United Nations or bilateral donors. This, in turn, strongly constrains their ability 
to engage with and confront conflict parties and thereby to act as peacemakers or 
peacebuilders within sovereign states.  
Secondly, and relatedly, in focusing on the legal, institutional, and political 
interface between IGOs and target state governments, I argue that IGOs’ reliance on 
alternative (i.e. non-state) sources of legitimacy and authority such as expert knowledge 
and moral credibility paradoxically further curtails their scope to act as peacemakers 
and peacebuilders vis-à-vis the host state government (Convergne 2016: 190). In 
contrast to most literature on international organizations that focuses on the relationship 
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between IGOs and their member states (principals), this article studies ‘the other end’ of 
the state-IGO interface, i.e. that between IGOs and the governments of states in receipt 
of post-war peace, development, or humanitarian assistance. These ‘host’ governments 
continue to be the primary partners, contractees, and thereby gatekeepers for 
international assistance of any kind with regard to interventions in their sovereign 
sphere. As a result, it is doubtful to what extent post-war peacebuilding endeavours 
conducted by IGOs can meaningfully address the causes and dynamics of ongoing 
societal or political conflict (Aggestam 2015). 
To what extent, then, and on what basis can IGOs act as peacebuilders in post-
war countries? This article puts forward an alternative framework for understanding the 
state/non-state divide in international organization to argue that a key resource for the 
capability of IGOs to act as peacebuilders is the purportedly non-political quality of 
special issue IGOs working in this field and the importance of their moral and expert 
credibility. This, in turn, narrowly delimits the type of peacebuilding that such 
organizations can conduct, potentially rendering them a source of maintaining and 
reinforcing power (im)balances rather than assisting in their transformation. The article 
hence rejects the functional hypothesis that activities and processes of IGOs are a 
functional response to policy issues, and advances an argument that it is the interaction 
between activities and seeking legitimacy for these that determines an IGO’s scope of 
action (Goetze 2020; Stage 2020; see also Moe and Geis 2020).  
The article offers a significant contribution to the literature on peacebuilding and 
post-war intervention by conceptualizing the role and scope of action of the broad range 
of civilian IGOs that together populate the grey area of peace support conducted outside 
the framework of UN peace operations. In reviewing the legal, institutional, and 
political framework that conditions IGOs’ room for manoeuvre, the article interrogates 
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the boundaries and types of peacebuilding that these organizations can conduct. The 
arguments presented here draw on a research project into the evolution of dominant 
IGO peacebuilding practices since the end of the Cold War. The project employed 
historical process tracing and a comprehensive discourse analysis of policy documents, 
resolutions, guidelines, and manuals of a set of international and bilateral peacebuilding 
organizations to trace changes in the practical reasoning on peacebuilding at the 
conceptual level and in two specific peacebuilding cases, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Timor-Leste. This research was complemented by a mix of participant observation and 
25 interviews with staff of international organizations and bilateral agencies in Bonn, 
Dili, Eschborn, Florence, Geneva, London, and Oslo.  
In the following sections, I firstly consider sources of legitimacy and authority 
for intrastate peacebuilding across different types of international organizations. I 
subsequently review Claude’s (1996) concept of the Two United Nations and related 
work conducted by the UN Intellectual History Project with a view to identifying and 
tracing the sources and resources of authority that IGOs draw on when working in the 
grey area of post-war peacebuilding. In the third section, I put forward a framework to 
explore the legal, institutional, and political parameters that circumscribe the role of 
IGOs in post-war peacebuilding. 
In discussing the limits of IGO engagement in peacebuilding, I do not make the 
case for greater political intervention in post-war societies, nor do I try to argue that 
their limitations are necessarily a major impediment to peacebuilding success. Instead, 
my argument is concerned with understanding the type of peacebuilding intervention 
that such organizations engage in by default and emphasizes the importance of re-
considering its political effects on target state societies on a case-by-case basis 
(Aggestam 2015).  
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1. Authority, legitimacy, and power across the state-non state divide 
According to classical definitions, ‘international organizations’ as a category comprises 
both intergovernmental (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 
(Rittberger, Zangl, and Kruck, 2013, 22). IGOs such as the United Nations and its 
agencies and bodies, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the International Organization for Migration, or the Bretton Woods 
institutions are created by sovereign states to conclude and implement an international 
treaty. Over time, the bureaucracies of some of these organizations have extended their 
institutional capacities and scope of action, thereby gaining greater independence from 
their original, state-driven agendas (Finnemore and Barnett 1999, 2004).  
In contrast to IGOs, the leverage of international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, or the International Crisis 
Group is almost entirely derived from their purportedly non-partisan, and frequently 
humanitarian, charitable, or otherwise altruistic mandates and reputations in conjunction 
with their recognized subject matter expertise (Barnett 2011; Terry 2002; Weiss, 
Carayannis, and Jolly 2009). Notwithstanding these different sources of leverage and 
authority between the IGO and INGO spheres, this article holds that IGOs and INGOs 
conducting peacebuilding activities within states share a similar concern with 
constructing and maintaining a reputation as honest brokers based on their moral and 
expert credibility. While both INGOs such as Human Rights Watch or IGOs like the 
UN Development Programme or the World Bank frequently see such legitimacy claims 
contested, their successful performance not only allows both types of international 
organizations to champion particular issues or agendas, such as good governance or 
sustainable development, but is often thrown into sharp relief with traditional, state-
based forms of power and the pursuit of national, partisan, or state-centred political 
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interests (Rittberger, Zangl, and Kruck 2013; Emmerij 2007).  
The notions of legitimacy and authority are closely linked, and I use them in 
conjunction with each other to emphasize the social and moral element of authority (as 
legitimate power) in the absence of an a priori legal or regulatory basis that legitimizes 
IGO action within states. When considering Beetham’s (1991) classic three dimensions 
of legitimacy, i.e. regulatory/law, social, and moral, it is evident that neither IGOs nor 
INGOs conducting peacebuilding interventions independent of a peacekeeping 
operation can a priori legitimize their work in the legal sense, as neither have any ‘right’ 
to conduct peacebuilding interventions independent of an agreement with the host state 
government. Instead, and as the following sections will demonstrate, such an agreement 
depends on their recognized (social) and moral (expert and non-partisan) legitimacy. 
This is, however, not to say that such a process takes place in a political vacuum.  
Clark (2007) develops a definition of legitimacy in international society that 
links its normative content with an emphasis on power and social interaction: “The 
normative substance of legitimacy … (is) supplied by a trio of contemporary norms – 
legality, morality, and constitutionality. These exist in a dynamic relationship and often 
pull in opposite directions” (166). What this means is that “norms …translate as 
legitimacy principles only through the filtering process of contested politics.” This 
process is “suffused with power relations, and it is hard to see where coercion stops and 
voluntarism starts in the production of it” (163). In the context of international 
organization, such processes can be observed in multiple instances in which the content 
of legitimate norms and practices (seemingly) follow the preferences of influential 
member states or coalitions that exert pressure on smaller or middling powers (Zaum 
2016, 1112; see also Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2011, 141-143). In the case of 
intra-state peacebuilding, however, the sovereignty of the gatekeeping host state 
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government affords it much greater leverage (power) with regard to accepting the 
legitimizing strategies of IGOs. Accordingly, the legitimacy and authority of both 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to act as peacebuilders 
principally, although certainly not exclusively, depends on their non-partisan and expert 
reputations as a key resource.  
Taking the centrality of credible non-partisanship and expertise as a key 
resource for peacebuilding seriously, I suggest replacing the conventional division 
between governmental and non-governmental types of international organizations with 
the distinction between state-based and non-state based sources of IO authority across 
the state-non-state divide. While most IGOs within and beyond the United Nations 
system draw on their member states to project political, military, or economic leverage, 
just like INGOs, these IGOs have increasingly come to rely on alternative sources of 
authority, including their subject matter expert status (Adler and Bernstein 2005; Gross 
Stein 2011; Sending 2015; Goetze 2017) and moral credibility (Kille 2007). 
To explore the relationship between different sources of IGO authority, the 
following section re-examines Claude’s (1996) distinction between the First and Second 
United Nations and his emphasis on distinct types of resources that these draw on in the 
area of international peace and security. Although Claude’s argument is only concerned 
with the UN proper, his insights, particularly with regard to the incompatibility of 
different types of IGO authority and legitimacy in peace support, can be harnessed for 
studying a broader set of IGOs.  
 
2. The Two United Nations and non-state resources for peacebuilding 
Claude (1996, 290) famously introduced a distinction between the two “identities” or 
“institutions” of the United Nations. The First United Nations comprises its “staff, an 
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international secretariat or bureaucracy located in New York, Geneva, and other 
regional headquarters. … Most discussions of the intentions, hopes, and plans of the UN 
refer in fact to the will of this First UN, as expressed by the secretary-general or his or 
her subordinate officials” (Claude 1996, 290). While this First UN de facto depends on 
the member states that “hold the power of life and death over the organization” (291), 
the degree to which member states can exert control varies from case to case and from 
state to state. Claude briefly alludes to, but hardly explores the complex relationship 
between the member states and the First UN as “sponsors, suppliers, supporters, and 
directors, its clients and customers, the beneficiaries of most of its activities”, but the 
key point is that the First UN is a “corporate entity” that is “separate but dependent” on 
member states (291).  
The Second UN, by contrast, is defined as “the collectivity formed by almost all 
the states of the world” (291). This collectivity commissions a secretariat to facilitate 
their cooperation, with “various states exercis(ing) leadership from time to time, in 
particular areas of policy” (291). Claude’s distinction, although admittedly a stark 
simplification of the complex webs of agency, accountability, and influence between the 
First and Second United Nations, provides a useful heuristic and conceptual device for 
unpacking the relationship between the different dimensions or ‘faces’ of the UN 
system (Cronin 2002; Weiss et al. 2009; Weiss et al. 2012). More important, however, 
for the purposes of the present article is the connection Claude draws between the “two 
organizations” and “two equally distinctive types of activity” in the field of global peace 
and security (Claude 1996, 291). He thereby develops a grid in which the “noncoercive, 
consensual, and neutral” activities are the “province” of the First UN (291), whilst the 
second category of “essentially judgmental, partisan, and coercive” activities are the 
province of the Second UN of member states (292).  
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The first set of activities comprises impartial assistance and requires basic 
goodwill and “prudence” (291) of the parties. On the part of interveners, the “essential 
resources” are “moral capital, reputation for fairness and freedom from political bias, 
and diplomatic skill” (292) to inspire trust that assistance will be rendered in an 
“evenhanded” manner. Activities of the second category are prompted by “the rejection 
of neutrality, the denial of the moral equivalence of the claims or behaviour of the 
parties, and the identification of one or more parties whose efforts should be defeated” 
(292) thus requiring intervening agencies to take sides and back their stance with 
“political and physical capabilities for decisive action” (ibid.).  
Claude’s distinction between the pacific settlement of disputes and coercive 
action (collective security) and the allocation of these tasks to different ‘identities’ of 
the United Nations obviously mirrors the distinction between the Secretariat of the 
United Nations on the one hand and the Security Council and General Assembly as its 
foremost political bodies on the other. What is central here is his normative and 
empirical argument for reinforcing and preserving the distinction between the two 
United Nations with a view to protecting the resources of the First UN to successfully 
execute its mandate in the area of peace and security. In other words, the First UN has 
to protect its “reputation for impartiality and fairmindedness in dealing with contentious 
situations” (294) by remaining and, importantly being perceived of as distinct from the 
Second UN as an explicitly political, and at times partial, organization capable of 
enforcement. With regard to coercive action, this applies both to cases of “overt” 
partiality when opposing “aggressors” and in cases of “ostensibly neutral and 
humanitarian” enforcement action (294), as even the latter will invariably have political 
consequences.  
The discussion surrounding the drawbacks of “marrying peacekeeping with (…) 
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elements of peace enforcement “ (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 93) at the interface of 
pacific dispute settlement and coercive action has been the focal point of most 
peacekeeping scholarship and policy debate since the early 1990s (Bellamy and 
Williams 2010; Paddon 2016; Sloan 2011; Tsagourias 2007; UN 2000, 2015a; 
UNDPKO 2008; White 2015). However, a similar, but less acknowledged conundrum 
faces all those agencies within and beyond the UN system that conduct a wide range of 
peacebuilding programmes in states emerging from internal conflict, both within and 
outside the framework of a UN peacekeeping operation mandated by the UN Security 
Council.  
What all these non-military (or non-coercive) IGOs have in common is that they 
commission, design, and/or implement operational activities such as peacebuilding 
programmes and projects within the sovereign space of states, and they very often do so 
in what I call the ‘grey area’ of peacebuilding, i.e. without the authority afforded by a 
peacekeeping mandate, mandate for self-defence, or the persuasive and coercive power 
of instruments such as the European Union’s Stabilisation and Association Process. 
Like the First UN of secretariat and staff, special agencies such as the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, but also the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and even, if 
thanks to its lending power to a lesser extent, the World Bank rely on their subject 
matter expertise and moral credibility as key resources for conducting peacebuilding 
activities within states.  
Particularly in regard to peacebuilding, this dependence on non-state sources of 
authority and legitimacy moves the First UN and other IGOs that lack coercive powers 
more closely into the realm of what Weiss et al. (2009, 123) have called the Third 
United Nations, i.e. “nongovernmental organizations, academics, consultants, experts, 
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independent commissions” etc. that interact with the bodies of the First and Second 
UN.3 Weiss and his colleagues at the UN Intellectual History Project are mainly 
interested in the circulation of and “shifts in ideas, policies, priorities, and practices” 
(Weiss et al. 2009, 123) across these three ‘components’. To this end, they do not 
suggest studying all IGOs/INGOs through the lens of the UN, but propose applying the 
tri-partite framework to other IGOs to simultaneously study the first, second, and third 
EU, OECD etc. (Weiss et al. 2009, 124). By contrast, and following Claude’s grid, my 
concern here is with the different dimensions and related key resources at the disposal 
of IGOs with regard to the grey area of intrastate peacebuilding. As I will show in the 
following section, outside a peace operation backed by a Security Council mandate, all 
special agencies, special issue, or non-military regional organizations are tied by the 
same constraints with regard to peacebuilding, as legitimate coercive action other than 
self-defence is the prerogative of the Security Council.  
To sum up this discussion, I build on Claude’s (1996) conceptualization of the 
First and Second United Nations and Weiss et al.’s (2009) notion of the Third United 
Nations to distinguish between three dimensions of international organization both 
within and beyond the UN system whose peacebuilding work draws on distinct sources 
of authority. The Three United Nations framework is useful, firstly in that it allows 
juxtaposing the influence of states as foremost actors and members of IGOs in shaping 
global governance with the agency of non-state actors such as international and national 
non-governmental organizations and think tanks, which make up the remainder of the 
so-called international community (see also Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009). Secondly, 
and more importantly for the purposes of the present article, the distinction between the 
‘Three UN’ helps emphasize the middle ground that the Secretariat and staff of the UN 
and of other IGOs (the First UN) inhabit in between the UN/IGOs of member states (the 
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Second UN) and the Third UN of INGOs and experts in regard to the sources of their 
authority and legitimacy when working in post-war peacebuilding.  
On the one hand, these IGOs draw on state-based forms of power when they are 
commissioned within the framework of a UN peacekeeping operation or supported by 
the material and immaterial clout of individual member states (or groups thereof). On 
the other hand, and particularly outside the framework of a peace operation mandated 
by the UN Security Council (Weiss et al. 2009, 124), the key sources and resources of 
IGO authority are arguably more akin to those of INGOs, as both intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations depend on the consent of target state governments, 
which thereby control or prohibit any form of unwanted interference. In addition, the 
principle of non-interference is also enshrined in the founding treaties of most IGOs. At 
the same time, as the following section will explore, the IGO-host state relationship is 
not simply defined in legal terms, but shaped by the ongoing negotiation of legal, 
institutional, and political parameters that define IGOs’ scope of action in intrastate 
peacebuilding.  
 
3. Parameters delimiting the scope of comprehensive IGO peacebuilding   
The following section employs the insights derived from the discussion of state and 
non-state sources of legitimacy and authority across the ‘Three United Nations’ to 
scrutinize the legal, institutional, and political parameters that circumscribe the extent to 
which IGOs can engage in comprehensive peacebuilding activities in contested settings. 
 
3.1 The international legal and institutional framework 
At the most basic level, the prohibition for the (First and Second) United Nations to 
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interfere in the domestic affairs of states is enshrined in Art. 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
Despite several related efforts to circumvent this provision, including the Responsibility 
to Protect (Ignatieff 2003), ‘gradations’ of or ‘shared’ sovereignty (Keohane 2003; 
Krasner 2004), the only exception to the ban on interference is foreseen if the Security 
Council recognizes the ‘existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression’ and invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize coercive 
measures.4 Simultaneously, at the inter-state level, the prohibition of interference is also 
maintained by a series of General Assembly resolutions (290, 1236, 2131, 2625) that 
have created a ban on military, economic, political, and other actions that violate 
another state’s sovereignty (Rittberger and Zangl 2006, 126). However, as Rittberger 
and Zangl (ibid.) argue, both provisions are in practice subject to change. Since the end 
of the Cold War, the Security Council has repeatedly determined that specific wars and 
continued serious human rights violations within states constituted a threat to 
international peace and security and has authorized military interventions. In addition, 
the General Assembly resolutions listed above also held that issues pertaining to 
decolonization, racism, and apartheid did not fall within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states (Rittberger and Zangl 2006, 126). Notwithstanding such stipulations, with the 
exception of decisions by the Security Council, the ban on any kind of intervention in 
the domestic affairs of states has – in theory, if not in practice – remained intact.  
Peacekeeping operations are subsidiary organs of the Security Council as a 
political body. They are usually headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General and either exclusively consent-based5 under the Council’s mandate for the 
pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) or additionally equipped with a Chapter VII 
mandate that endows the operation with defined powers within the target state and vis-
à-vis the respective government (Guéhenno and Sherman 2009, 6). In addition, and 
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regardless of whether an operation is authorized under Chapter VI or VII of the UN 
Charter, the fact that peacekeeping operations are usually authorized by the Security 
Council – and exceptionally – the General Assembly, also serves to ensure broad 
political support (Martin and Fortna 2009).  
By contrast, peacebuilding undertakings comprise a large number of 
organizations that are not in any way mandated by the Security Council, General 
Assembly, or otherwise linked to a peace(-keeping) operation and the legal and political 
clout afforded them.6 Unless an international transitory administration has been 
established, most external agencies, be they governmental or non-governmental ones, 
work on the basis of bilateral agreements with the host state government. This, in turn, 
raises the question of political and legal power relationships, particularly in cases where 
external organizations competitively bid for development and reconstruction contracts 
(Dann 2013).7 Against this backdrop, there have been multiple efforts at coordinating, 
integrating, or mainstreaming peacebuilding across the UN system and beyond to 
project greater political leverage and leadership vis-à-vis target state governments. Early 
on, Boutros-Ghali had advocated a lead coordinating and authorizing role for the UN 
Secretariat on behalf of the UN Security Council – albeit with little success particular in 
view of the refusal of the humanitarian parts of the organization to coordinate their 
efforts with the political organs (UNSG 1995; UNOCHA 2011).  
Before the UN peacebuilding architecture was created in 2005, the Department 
for Political Affairs (DPA, now Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) was 
in charge of peacebuilding policy (Barnett, O’Donnell, and Sitea 2007, 42). However, 
until at least 2010, none of the UN documents that summarize and reflect on strategic or 
operational peacebuilding practice include any reference to DPA publications or 
guidelines (although occasionally mentioning DPA input). In addition, it seems that the 
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Department for Political Affairs has not published any guidance or strategy whatsoever 
prior to a limited number of manuals on mediation starting in 2010.8 Given the strong 
interfaces and overlaps between peacemaking and peacebuilding (Ramsbotham et al. 
2011, 14) and the political character of the latter (UNSG 2009, 17, 31), DPA’s earlier 
‘silence’ with regard to any visible leadership in regard to peacebuilding is rather 
surprising.9  
To address gaps in peacebuilding leadership, in 2005, the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC) was created as an intergovernmental advisory body tasked with 
facilitating ‘a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconciliation’ (UNSC 1645, 1). The membership of the Commission 
is recruited from the Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social 
Council, thereby underscoring the Commission’s key purpose in establishing a 
permanent link between the First and Second UN’s peacebuilding resources, i.e. 
credible non-partisan expertise on the one hand and political leverage on the other. In 
this vein, particularly in regard to countries that the Commission officially takes onto its 
agenda, the chair of the Commission is supposed to fulfil a diplomatic and political role, 
which appears to be a unique provision and arguably reflects the recognition of the 
political nature of and leadership gap in most peacebuilding endeavours. In addition to 
facilitating continuity of financing, learning, and policy attention, it is evident from the 
close link between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council, General 
Assembly, and Economic and Social Council as key political bodies that a central 
purpose in creating the Peacebuilding Commission has been the establishment of a 
permanent high-level intergovernmental body, i.e. a political body whose work might 
enforce that of other ad hoc fora and bolster the efforts of various IGOs that conduct 
peacebuilding independently of a peace(-keeping) operation. However, as the 
 19 
Peacebuilding Commission is not equipped with any executive functions, Paris (2009, 
74) concludes: ‘The challenge ... is to strike a balance between preserving the flexibility 
of the existing networked structures ... and the requirement of some measure of 
hierarchy on the other’, particularly with regard to adding greater political “weight” to 
peacebuilding strategies (UN 2010, 16). This balance, however, does not appear to have 
been struck thus far, as illustrated by subsequent UN reviews of the Commission’s work 
(UN 2010, 2015), and it remains to be seen whether recent institutional reforms such as 
the relocation of the Peacebuilding Support Office to the new Department of Political 
and Peacebuilding Affairs will have the desired effect of enhancing strategic 
coordination. In view of Claude’s (1996) argument regarding the preservation of the 
First and Second UN’s distinct resources for contributing to peace and security, and 
particularly the First UN’s reliance on non-partisanship and expertise, the question 
arises whether any attempt at bringing the clout of the Second UN to bear on the work 
of the First risks compromising this reputation.  
3.2. The founding treaties and mandates of intergovernmental organizations  
Intergovernmental organizations working within particular states rely on cooperation 
agreements with the government of the host state. These governments commission 
organizations to provide services or to ‘support and supplement … national efforts’ in 
their areas of expertise (Govt. of BiH and UNDP 1995), such as for example institution 
building, governance reform, refugee return, and dialogue processes.10 In executing 
such mandates, most IGOs are bound by the principles of neutrality and impartiality as 
derived from the norm of non-interference. In the case of the World Bank, as the most 
important multilateral development donor, the prohibition of political interference in the 
domestic affairs of recipient states is contained in Art V(10) of the founding treaties of 
the  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: ‘The Association and its 
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officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member .... Only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be 
weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement’ (cited in 
Dann 2013, 161).  
Based on Weller’s (1998) typology of the legal quality of impartiality in 
international organizations, in the case of the World Bank impartiality is not only a 
constitutional principle (i.e. inscribed in the organization’s founding documents) but 
also defined in operational terms as part of the code of conduct. What is more, these 
principles have also been a part of the substantive justification of the Bank’s practice. 
As Dann (2013, 111-115) argues, despite the manifestly increasing intrusiveness of 
development practices in the legislative and hence political affairs of recipient states 
since the 1980s (e.g. ‘structural adjustment’), and in the 1990s with regard to human 
rights and governance, the prohibition of political interference was taken seriously by 
the World Bank well into the 1990s, if only for strategic reasons. This evident paradox 
has in practice been ‘resolved’ by applying seemingly objective, quantifiable, and 
measurable economic categories that justified the application of conditionality criteria 
in the technocratic language of ‘structural adjustment’. A recent example for this 
process of decoupling the political content from development and/or ‘post-war 
reconstruction’ practice is evident in the degree to which the World Bank has sought to 
justify and frame its governance agenda in purportedly purely economic terms by 
defining four areas of governance that are deemed ‘non-political’: public sector 
management, accountability, rule of law, and transparency and the fight against 
corruption (Shihata and Attali 1990, cited in Dann 2013, 116). Given the widespread 
criticism of World Bank practices among policy makers, observers, and beyond 
(Duffield 2007; Marquette 2004), these strategies on the part of the World Bank have 
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only partly been successful, but they are in any case maintained by the Bank’s lending 
power and standing as a major donor. By contrast, organizations with less financial 
clout like UNDP have carefully curated their non-partisan expert reputations (Murphy 
2006) as a ‘service provider’, or to quote a 2003 planning document for Timor-Leste, ‘a 
partner of preference for governments, with a special mandate to press for improved 
governance and poverty reduction’ (UNDP 2003, 21). 
In sum, then, unless an international transitory administration (ITA) or 
peacekeeping operation with a far-reaching mandate has been established, most external 
agencies, be they intergovernmental, governmental (bilateral), or non-governmental 
ones, work on the basis of bilateral agreements with the host state government. This, in 
turn raises the question of political and legal power relationships, and the degree to 
which the host state government can seek alternative partners or donors that are not 
suspected of interference (e.g. the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
those of other emerging powers, Strange et al. 2015). The issue is further exacerbated in 
cases where intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations competitively bid 
for development contracts (Dann 2013), thereby providing a strong additional incentive 
for IGOs to try and preserve their neutral and non-partisan reputations as members of 
the First UN.11  
 
3.3. Political considerations: Leverage and legitimacy  
After the mid-1990s to mid-2000s had seen an unprecedented degree of intervention by 
IGOs in post-war peace support operations, the last decade witnessed a changing 
geopolitical power balance and the rise to prominence of alternative donors (Quadir 
2013; Strange et al. 2015). These developments have changed the terms of the debate on 
the role, influence, and interests of IOs in the domestic affairs of post-war and transition 
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states. In this regard, the rising engagement of donors such as the Chinese government 
that neither follow the criteria established by the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) for 
official development assistance nor tie their investments or assistance to conditionality 
criteria in post-war or transitioning states has weakened the hegemony and bargaining 
power of traditional (OECD-DAC) donors and affiliated IGOs. While criticisms of 
actual or suspected political interference of donors, IGOs, and INGOs are by no means 
a new phenomenon (Duffield 2007; Hazeldine 2010), a series of high-profile 
controversies and government decisions has intensified the controversy on questions of 
legitimacy and accountability (Collingwood and Logister 2005; Vedder 2007). 
Examples range from government prohibitions and restrictions on the work of all kinds 
of agencies – be they international governmental or non-governmental organizations, or 
local NGOs receiving foreign funding – in Ethiopia, Egypt, China, Myanmar, Russia, 
and Turkey, to the international controversy surrounding alleged IO interference in the 
Arab Spring and Maidan protests. Several IOs, both governmental and non-
governmental ones, are voicing concerns regarding the shrinking political space for 
their engagement (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). The political bodies of some 
IGOs, including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
Council of Europe, have issued statements calling for the protection of the work of 
international and national non-governmental organizations (CoE 2016; OSCE and CoE 
2015).  
Beyond concerns regarding the global restoration of authoritarian forms of 
governance, the controversy surrounding the work of international governmental and 
non-governmental organizations within the domestic affairs of states directs attention to 
the interactions between state parties and IOs working at the intersection of 
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humanitarian aid, human rights, democracy promotion, peacebuilding, and 
development. If IGOs are commissioned by or partner with host state governments in 
the aftermath of violent conflict, this implies that their engagement risks having an 
inherent bias towards that government, at the very least in terms of validating it through 
their partnership, and thereby to maintaining the political status quo. Several IGOs and 
donors have long since partnered with non-governmental bodies to avoid channelling all 
available funds to governments (see also Richmond and Carey 2005). This strategy has 
in recent years prompted a rapidly rising number of governments to significantly curtail 
the scope of action of externally funded national non-governmental organizations 
(ICNL 2016). Notwithstanding such efforts, particularly in contested settings, 
international organizations partnering with recipient governments can effectively claim 
‘political neutrality’ only if the government is not itself the subject of a political conflict 
within the country concerned, at which point peacebuilding actors risk ‘taking sides’ on 
behalf of the government or at the very least being perceived of doing so.12  
A standard approach to handling this dilemma is exemplified by the OECD-
DAC (1997) guidelines Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the 
Threshold of the 21st Century. The guidelines (1997, 129) hold that co-operation in 
conflict areas presupposes the ‘broad acceptance throughout society of the legitimacy of 
the state and the credibility of the institutions of governance’ and describe the role of 
external organizations as that of a non-political facilitator, educator, or trainer (113). 
Accordingly, the role of external actors in this process is primarily described in terms of 
strengthening local processes and building the required capacity, typically on behalf of 
or in close cooperation with the respective government. Such developmental notions of 
building structural stability and equality and the related paradigms of ‘strengthening 
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skills and building capacities’ have strongly shaped the ‘technocratic turn’ (Mac Ginty 
2012) of IGO peacebuilding.  
Not only do these paradigms tie in seamlessly with the traditional development 
agendas of many special issue organizations, but they also allow them to square the 
circle of maintaining and defending their non-political and non-partisan reputations 
while at the same time engaging in post-war peacebuilding-as-capacity building. In this 
regard, only a careful scrutiny of their practices on a case-by-case basis would allow for 
an assessment whether IGOs such as the UNDP are indeed successful in seeking to 
combine their role as ‘service providers’ with their ‘special mandate to press for 
improved governance and poverty reduction’ (UNDP 2003, 21).  
This discussion has shown that the scope for legitimate peacebuilding 
interventions by intergovernmental (and non-governmental) organizations of any kind 
in intra-state peacebuilding is limited. It crucially depends on IGOs’ expertise and 
credible non-partisanship as non-state sources of legitimacy and authority. This holds 
particularly true if transitioning or post-war states can tap into the resources of 
alternative donors whose assistance or investments are not tied to political 
conditionality criteria. Not only are peace support interventions within states beyond the 
original remit of most organizations except for the political bodies of the UN (i.e. the 
Security Council, and, by extension some regional organizations under Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter), but they frequently run counter to the standard mandates and practices 
of most IGOs, many of which hail from the humanitarian and development sectors. 
Their access to contested settings and their standing as legitimate ‘honest brokers’ as a 
key resource for conducting peacebuilding within states depends on the extent to which 
such organizations can successfully project an image of themselves as non-partisan, 
impartial, and credible experts. Such a performance is not only indispensable to gaining 
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access and cooperation to a particular contested setting, but it is also a vital component 
of an IGO’s reputation vis-à-vis prospective host state governments and peers in their 
field of expertise to ‘establish themselves as strong and reliable development partners’ 
(UNDP 2000, 3). To the extent that the central government of the target state is a party 
to such conflicts, IGOs’ room for manoeuvre, and thereby for conducting 
comprehensive peacebuilding that directly addresses underlying patterns of inequality 
or exclusion, is limited by their need to preserve their non-partisan reputation. In regard 
to intra-state peacebuilding, then, and notwithstanding the political and economic clout 
of their member states, IGOs’ dependence on non-state sources of legitimacy and 
authority simultaneously enables and constrains their scope of action.  
Conclusion 
This article has contributed to how we understand the legal, institutional, and political 
parameters that delimit the capacity of IGOs to conduct post-war peacebuilding in a 
comprehensive manner. My argument has drawn on a growing body of literature that 
study IGO bureaucracies as increasingly self-directed actors in global governance. On 
the one hand, organizations such as the UNDP or the World Bank have made 
substantive inroads with regard to shaping global policy agendas on issues such as 
sustainable development, conflict prevention, or good governance, many of which are 
relevant in post-war peacebuilding. On the other hand, however, while IGOs are 
expanding their original mandates, outside the confines of an UN-mandated 
peacekeeping operation (Ch. VII), their engagement in post-war peacebuilding is 
narrowly defined by a set of legal, institutional, and political parameters. As my 
analysis has emphasized, as IGOs have adopted post-war peacebuilding within states to 
their agendas, the successful performance and maintenance of a non-partisan non-
political identity has become a key source and cornerstone of IGO authority and 
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legitimacy in peacebuilding. This is not to deny the importance of other sources of IGO 
authority, i.e. the political leverage and bargaining power of member states, and it is 
certainly not to claim that IGO interventions as such are non-political. Political 
bargaining processes among IGO member states are notoriously hard to research and 
well beyond the focus of this article (see also Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2011, 
142). Instead, the argument made here is is that the fact that intergovernmental 
organizations have to create and preserve non-political, non-partisan reputations that 
mirror the key characteristics of Claude’s (1996) First United Nations to gain the 
acceptance and cooperation of host state governments renders them less likely to engage 
in the political dimensions of a peace process. In the field of post-war peacebuilding, 
political neutrality and non-partisanship have effectively become indispensable sources 
of legitimate IGO-authority, making their scope of action vis-à-vis host state 
governments arguably more akin to those of INGOs as part of the Third UN of INGOs 
and independent experts than to the Second UN of member states.  
While the main purpose of this article has been to analyse the scope of action of 
IGOs operating in the grey area of peacebuilding, further research is needed to unpack 
the range of diverse IGO strategies that undoubtedly exist between different IGOs and 
across peacebuilding settings. Strategies will likely depend on the bargaining positions 
of specific host state governments, for instance in regard to the availability of 
alternative donors. More importantly, such strategies will vary according to the financial 
clout and mandates of particular organizations and the degree to which their 
commitment to non-partisanship is not only a function of their status as 
intergovernmental organizations as in the case of the international financial institutions, 
but a key prerequisite to their ‘ordinary’, for instance humanitarian work as in the case 
of UNDP or UNHCR (UNOCHA 2011). 
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What, then, are the implications of my argument for the prospects of successful 
IGO peaebuilding? Several authors (Autesserre 2010; Paddon 2014; Pantuliano 2014) 
and UN evaluations (UN 2010, 2015, 2015a) have emphasized the importance of 
linking peacebuilding to an ongoing political (peace) process. To the extent that 
political conflict persists after the conclusion of a peace agreement, this necessitates the 
continuance of peacemaking efforts such as mediation and reconciliation beyond the 
initial settlement and beyond a country’s political elite. Such efforts are already 
underway, for instance in the case of UNDP’s programme to strengthen local dialogue 
institutions and mechanisms in Timor-Leste (UNDP 2008, 2011). As my analysis has 
shown, it is evident that such a task largely falls outside the remit of most IGOs in cases 
of contested governance, i.e. if the government is a (former) conflict party. An 
important question that would result from my research is hence: who should be 
entrusted with aiding the political aspects of peacebuilding? Within UN peace 
operations, such tasks are usually conducted by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (UN DPKO 2003). While the expectations vis-à-vis the steering role 
of the Peacebuilding Commission in this regard have not been fulfilled (UN 2015), the 
recent reform and expansion of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 
seems to reflect the recognition that peacemaking, i.e. mediation and reconciliation 
efforts as part of a wider peacebuilding process, ought to continue beyond the 
conclusion of a settlement. By contrast, as argued above, it seems unlikely that this task 
can be fulfilled by any of the special issue IGOs even if they enjoy the general backing 
of the host state government in situations of cooperative peacebuilding. 
In short, the problem of IGO peacebuilding in intra-state conflict is directly 
related to the perennial discussion of the tension between balancing the norms of 
sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of state with substantive, and 
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hence at times political, forms of support to peacebuilding processes, i.e. comprehensive 
peacebuilding. In this regard, it links back to the bigger normative debates surrounding 
contested norms and instruments relating to ‘humanitarian interventions’, the prevention 
of gross violations of human rights, and the Responsibility to Protect. As I have argued, 
the very same dilemmas that have hampered the extension of peacekeeping mandates 
with enforcement action in cases where there is ‘no peace to keep’ are also at play in 
regard to peacebuilding conducted by IGOs in contested settings. Not only is the failure 
to engage with the political side of a peace process likely to delimit the chances of 
peacebuilding ‘success’, but it crucially reifies existing power (im-)balances.  
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1 For a detailed discussion on UN Peacebuilding, please refer to Stage’s (2020) contribution to 
this special section. 
2 I would like to thank Catherine Goetze for suggesting this notion.  
3 Note that Weiss et al. (2009) and Kittikhoun and Weiss (2012, 120) invert Claude’s (1996) 
original distinction between the First and Second UN. 
4 See Johnson (2014) and Richardson (2014) on the scope of action of the UN General 
Assembly for advising enforcement action beyond self-defence under Uniting for Peace. 
5 In practice, most peace operations heavily compromise or suspend the sovereignty of the host 
state government, see Chesterman (2004, 56-57).  
6 See Howard and Dayal (2016, 192-193) on standard definitions of peace(-keeping) operations 
that ‘exclude peacebuilding and political missions that are primarily composed of civilians.’  
7 Interview, Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes, Federal German Ministry for 
International Cooperation and Development, August 2012.  
8 A full list is available from <http://www.peacemaker.un.org/resources/mediation-guidance> (08 
May 2018). In addition, there is one report by the SG/DPA on preventive diplomacy. 
9 Almost all other Secretariat departments and divisions, operational agencies, the former 
Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), the Executive Office, and the Policy 
Committee of the Secretary-General have issued commentary and guidance on peacebuilding. 
Beyond the Secretariat, decisions and recommendations were issued by the Security Council 
and the General Assembly (Fifth Committee; Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations). 
10 Interviews with Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes, Federal German Ministry of 
International Cooperation and Development, Bonn, August 2012; Early Recovery and 
Peacebuilding Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, February 2014, and Head 
of Section Governance, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
Eschborn, December 2015. 
11 Interview, Desk Officer for Cooperation Programmes, Federal German Ministry for 
International Cooperation and Development, Bonn, August 2012.  
12 Witness, for instance, the reporting on forced resettlements in Ethiopia, some of which are 
claimed to have occurred in the course of projects funded by the World Bank and the UK 
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Department for International Development, see <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/world-bank-
address-failings-resettlement> (08 May 2018).  
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